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UNCERTAINTY AND LOSS IN THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UNDER GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS
SARAH F. SUMA*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long recognized that citizens retain First
Amendment rights during periods of public employment.' When the gov-
ernment, acting as an employer, restricts an employee's speech that is made
as a citizen on a matter of public concern, courts have applied a balancing
test to determine whether the government is justified in treating the em-
ployee differently from any other member of the public. 2 However, in 2006
the Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos that the First Amendment
does not protect speech made pursuant to a public employee's official du-
ties. 3 Under the bright-line rule established by Garcetti, the government, as
employer, does not need to justify its restrictions or retaliatory acts based
on its employees' speech made pursuant to their job duties.
4
Four justices dissented in Garcetti.5 Justice Souter objected to the ma-
jority's new rule and argued that the Court should retain a balancing ap-
proach for speech made pursuant to job duties. 6 While recognizing that
"necessary judicial line-drawing sometimes looks arbitrary," Justice Souter
asserted that there was "no adequate justification" for the majority's cate-
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2008. B.A.,
Liberal Arts, St. John's College, 2002. The author thanks Professor Steve J. Heyman for his valuable
comments.
1. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down a statute requiring disclosure of
prior organization memberships as violative of public employees' right to freedom of association);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (striking down a statute requiring a loyalty oath that would
preclude from public employment those innocently associating with certain subversive organizations).
2. E.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968).
3. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006). Garcetti's holding does not affect other
legal claims that may be available to public employees that suffer workplace retaliation based on their
speech, including claims brought under whistleblower protection statutes, tort claims for retaliatory
discharge, or claims based on breach of an employment contract. Such claims are beyond the scope of
this comment.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1962-76 (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens dissented).
6. Id. at 1965-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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gorical rule excluding job-required speech from protection. 7 Justice Ste-
vens also found the distinction arbitrary: "it is senseless to let constitutional
protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a
job description."'8 In addition to these principled objections to the bright-
line rule, the dissenting justices also raised practical concerns about the
results of the majority's new approach, such as increased litigation over the
scope of "job duties" and the new incentive for public employees to air
their grievances through improper channels. 9
This comment considers these challenges to the majority's approach.
The first section describes judicial review of First Amendment claims in
the public employment context prior to Garcetti. The second section briefly
outlines the Garcetti majority and dissenting opinions. The third section
considers the liberty interests at stake in speech made pursuant to public
employment, and asserts that the majority's bright-line rule arbitrarily re-
stricts First Amendment rights and is inconsistent with relevant First
Amendment theory. The fourth section considers practical and policy ob-
jections to the bright-line rule and concludes that Garcetti may prompt
litigation, discourage internal reporting, and preclude protection for the
most valuable forms of public employee speech. At the same time, section
four examines these practical objections in light of recent cases interpreting
Garcetti and proposes guidelines for how Garcetti should be interpreted
and applied in order to mitigate these practical drawbacks.
I. PRE- GARCETTI PRECEDENT
Public employees l0 were once thought to have waived certain consti-
tutional protections by accepting the terms of public employment. I I How-
ever, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that citizens retain First Amendment rights during public employment.12 At
the same time, the Court affirmed that the government has an undeniable
interest in regulating the speech of its employees and that the First
Amendment must be interpreted in light of that interest within the context
of public employment. 13
7. Id. at 1965 (Souter, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting), 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).
10. This comment refers to local, state, and federal employees as "public employees."
11. In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, Justice Holmes famously wrote that a police officer
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional ight to be a policeman." 29
N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
12. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (citing cases).
13. See id.
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In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court evaluated a
public school teacher's First Amendment claim against his employer, who
terminated his employment because of a letter he sent to a local newspaper
criticizing school board officials.14 The Court sought to "arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-
ters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro-
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."' 15 The Court found that these interests weighed in favor of the
teacher, since he spoke on a matter of legitimate public concern and in a
manner that did not interfere with his regular duties or the operations of the
school. 16 Although the teacher's letter included false statements, the Court
also emphasized the public's interest in the teacher's ability to publish his
opinions.17 The Court characterized this protection of free expression as a
matter of democratic necessity. 18 It described the electing public's interest
in becoming informed through "free and unhindered debate" as the "core
value" of the Free Speech Clause. 19
Later, in Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court clarified that the gov-
ernment's conduct will be scrutinized under the Pickering balancing test
only when the employee speech at stake is speech made as a citizen on a
matter of public interest. 20 The Court held that when an individual speaks
"as an employee upon matters only of personal interest," federal courts are
"not the appropriate forum" to review government disciplinary action.21 In
Connick, as in Pickering, the Court grounded its First Amendment analysis
on the need of a self-governing society to be informed through open debate
on matters of public concern.22 The speech at issue in Connick included a
questionnaire distributed by the plaintiff to other staff members regarding
internal work conditions and policies. 23 In the Court's view, only one ques-
tion on the plaintiffs questionnaire touched upon a matter of public con-
14. Id. at 564.
15. Id. at 568.
16. Id. at 572-73.
17. Id. at 571-72.
18. Id. ("On [questions left to popular vote] free and open debate is vital to informed decision-
making by the electorate. Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent.
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of re-
taliatory dismissal.").
19. Id. at 573.
20. 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 145.
23. Id. at 141.
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cern.24 The other questions were not protected under the First Amendment
because they did not relate to matters of public concern. 25 In other words,
they did not serve the purpose of informing the electing public of govern-
ment ineffectiveness or abuse.
26
While the Court in Connick held that the Pickering test applies only
when speech is made "as a citizen upon matters of public concern," it em-
phasized and explained only the "matter of public concern" part of this
requirement.27 Nevertheless, some circuit courts interpreted Pickering and
Connick as creating an independent requirement that speech be made "as a
citizen" and not "as an employee. '28 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
speech made pursuant to job duties was not protected speech because it was
not speech made "as a citizen."' 29 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit expressly
rejected a per se rule that would preclude protection for speech made pur-
suant to job duties and concentrated on the "matter of public concern" re-
quirement. 30 The approach of other circuits was less clear. Generally,
courts in other circuits considered whether speech was related to an em-
ployee's job duties, but only occasionally found such a relationship deter-
minative.31
II. THE GARCETTI DECISIONS
Ceballos v. Garcetti was one of the cases in which the Ninth Circuit
rejected the argument that speech made as an employee could not be con-
stitutionally protected. 32 The plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, served as calendar
deputy for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, where his
duties included the supervision of other lawyers.33 A defense attorney in-
formed Ceballos that a case being handled by the District Attorney's Office
involved a search warrant obtained with a questionable affidavit. 34 Cebal-
los investigated the affidavit and concluded that some of the sworn state-
24. Id. at 149 (concluding that the question regarding whether employees felt "pressured to work
in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates" touched upon a matter of public con-
cern).
25. Id. at 148-49.
26. Id. at 148.
27. Id. at 146-49.
28. See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,407-08 (4th Cir. 2000).
29. Id.
30. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004); Roth v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988).
31. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1177, 1177 n.7 (describing conflicting precedent in other circuits).
32. Id. at 1178.
33. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
34. Id.
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ments made by a deputy sheriff were misrepresentations. 35 Ceballos sub-
mitted two memos to his supervisor regarding his investigation of the affi-
davit.36 Ceballos claimed that his supervisors violated his free speech rights
when they retaliated against him based on the content of the first of those
memos. 37
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on grounds that the defendants were protected by qualified immu-
nity.38 The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. 39 The
Ninth Circuit followed circuit precedent and rejected the idea that the First
Amendment never protects speech made pursuant to public work duties. 40
Applying the Pickering balancing test, the court concluded that the interests
supporting protection of Ceballos's speech outweighed the government's
interest in disciplining him, since his speech would not disrupt the effi-
ciency of the District Attorney's Office. 4 1 One judge specially concurred,
stating that although circuit precedent did support the majority's decision,
that precedent should be revisited since "when public employees speak in
the course of carrying out their routine, required employment obligations,
they have no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise
to a First Amendment right."'42
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and held
that Ceballos's speech, made pursuant to his official duties, was not consti-
tutionally protected. 43 The Court reasoned that speech made pursuant to
work duties is not speech made "as a private citizen" and that it can never
be protected under the First Amendment. 44 Thus, under Garcetti, speech
made pursuant to a public employee's job duties is unprotected-regardless
of the government's interest in controlling it or the public's interest in hear-
ing it.45
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that the holding
was consistent with earlier precedent because it acknowledged the defer-
ence due to the government in managing its operations and because it did
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1955-56.
37. Id. at 1956.
38. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. Id. at 1185.
40. Id. at 1174-75 (citing Roth v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988)).
41. Id. at 1180.
42. Id. at 1185-89 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
44. Id.
45. Seeid. at 1961.
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not preclude employees from participating in public debate.46 Justice Ken-
nedy criticized the Ninth Circuit's proposed rule, which would "commit
state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating
judicial oversight of communications between and among government
employees and their superiors in the course of official business. '47 Under
Justice Kennedy's reasoning, protection of speech made pursuant to work
duties would be inappropriate because "there is no relevant analogue to
speech by citizens who are not government employees.
48
In dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that the "notion that there is a cate-
gorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course
of one's employment is quite wrong. '49 The result of such a distinction
would be arbitrary: "it is senseless to let constitutional protection for ex-
actly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.
' 50
As a practical matter, Justice Stevens wrote that the new rule would create
a perverse incentive for employees to "voice their concerns publicly before
talking frankly to their superiors."
'51
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, Jus-
tice Souter also rejected the majority's use of a categorical exclusion. 52 In
earlier cases "the Court realized that a public employee can wear a citizen's
hat when speaking on subjects closely tied to the employee's own
job ... even when the speech is not addressed to the public at large."
'53
Justice Souter asserted that even though the government's interests in man-
aging speech pursuant to job duties would generally be great, a balancing
test was still necessary because "the individual and public value of such
speech is no less, and may well be greater, when the employee speaks pur-
suant to his duties in addressing a subject he knows intimately for the very
reason that it falls within his duties."' 54 Justice Souter proposed a modified
balancing test for speech made pursuant to work duties with a presumption
in favor of the government that could be overcome only by a showing that
the employee "speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high
standards of responsibility in the way he does it.
' '55
46. Id. at 1960.
47. Id. at 1961.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1963 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1964.
54. Id. at 1965.
55. Id. at 1967.
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Justice Breyer also dissented. 56 He noted the unique circumstances
prompting Ceballos's speech-Ceballos was bound, as an attorney, to com-
port with professional canons and was required, as a prosecutor, to share
impeachment evidence with the defense. 57 Justice Breyer asserted that
when such professional and special constitutional obligations require a
public employee to speak, the government likely has limited justification
for interfering with that speech. 58 In such cases, Justice Breyer would apply
the Pickering balancing test. 59
III. GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC, AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS IN SPEECH MADE
PURSUANT TO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Justices Souter and Stevens both contended that the majority's bright-
line rule arbitrarily circumscribes First Amendment protection. The funda-
mental disagreement between the dissenting justices and the majority stems
from their differing conclusions about whether the public or government
employees have any liberty interest in speech made pursuant to public job
duties, and whether those interests can ever outweigh the government's
significant interests in effective management. In evaluating the majority's
bright-line approach, it is helpful to review the underlying assumptions that
Justices Kennedy and Stevens make about the liberty interests at stake in
speech made pursuant to work duties.
Justice Kennedy emphasized the government's "heightened interests
in controlling speech made by an employee in his or her professional ca-
pacity."'60 On the other side of the scale, Justice Kennedy gave little, if any,
credence to the employee's liberty interest in job-required speech. 61 He
recognized that public employees retain the liberties they enjoy as private
citizens, but asserted that there was no fundamental right under the First
Amendment to "perform their jobs however they see fit."' 62 Justice Ken-
nedy also gave minimal weight to the public's interest in constitutional
protection of speech made pursuant to work duties. He recognized the
"public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government em-
ployees engaging in civic discussion. '63 However, because that interest
could be satisfied where public employees engage in public discourse out-
56. Id. at 1973 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1974.
58. Id. at 1975.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1960 (majority opinion).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 1958, 1960.
63. Id. at 1958.
20081
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
side of their work duties, Justice Kennedy saw little societal value in pro-
tecting work-required speech. 6
4
Justice Souter agreed with Justice Kennedy that the government's in-
terest was likely heightened when speech is made pursuant to job duties.65
However, Justice Souter disputed whether the fact that speech is job-
required diminishes the other interests balanced under Pickering.66
With regard to the employee's interests, Justice Souter argued that an
employee's interest in his work-required speech can be significant, since "a
citizen may well place a very high value on a right to speak on the public
issues he decides to make the subject of his work day after day."'67 Justice
Souter pointed out that government entities, including Ceballos's own dis-
trict attorney's office, attempt to attract public employees who will bring
personal conviction to their roles by emphasizing the personal satisfaction
that can stem from public service. 68
Thus, while Justice Kennedy viewed work-required speech simplisti-
cally-as stemming only from the fact of employment 69-Justice Souter
acknowledged the actual predicament of the public employee as someone
who arrives at work with multi-faceted interests and obligations. Public
employees' roles in government administration do not supplant their inter-
ests as citizens in speaking out to promote safe, efficient, and honest gov-
ernment. Thus, public employees retain an interest in their speech whether
or not it closely relates or falls within their job duties.
With regard to the public's interest, Justice Souter argued that there is
a significant interest in receiving the job-required speech of public employ-
ees because such speech is likely to be well-informed. 70 Justice Souter did
not address Justice Kennedy's contention that the public's interest can be
satisfied regardless of whether job-required speech is protected, since pub-
lic employees are not prevented from engaging in public discourse. 71 Nev-
ertheless, a specific public interest exists in the job-required speech of
public employees.
64. Id. at 1960.
65. Id. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1965.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1966 n.4.
69. Justice Kennedy asserted that public employees lack a liberty interest when they are "simply
performing" their job duties, because such speech is not analogous to speech by citizens who are not
government employees; however, Kennedy does not consider that even speech that is distinctly related
to public employment may nevertheless stem in part from personal interests. Id. at 1961 (majority
opinion).
70. Id. at 1966-67 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 1960 (majority opinion).
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First, the public has an interest in any job-required speech of public
employees that plays a role in government decisionmaking. As described in
section four, it is undesirable as a practical matter to encourage public em-
ployees to publicize their grievances rather than present them through pre-
scribed channels. 72 The public's interest in efficient government operations
would require some protection of proper avenues for internal communica-
tion.
Second, the public has an interest in job-required speech that facili-
tates informed decisionmaking by the voting public, and therefore impli-
cates the Court's primary rationale for First Amendment protection of
public employee speech. Job-required speech can directly contribute to
public discourse. For example, when a public employee is required to speak
at government meetings that are open to the public, job-required speech
will include direct public speech. Even purely internal job-required com-
munications may indirectly contribute to public discourse, because once an
issue is raised internally it is more likely to become publicly known, espe-
cially where the government operates with transparency.
Third, the public has a significant interest in job-required speech that
serves to check government abuse. For example, the public interest is
served when a public employee internally exposes a supervisor or co-
worker's fiscal mismanagement or fraud. Although the Court has primarily
highlighted the self-government theory in its cases examining First
Amendment protection of public employees, the "checking value" is an
independent and highly relevant theory of the First Amendment. 73 If one
adopts the theory that the Free Speech Clause serves as a vital check on
potential abuses of government authority, one must conclude that the First
Amendment should protect a public employee's efforts to expose govern-
ment misconduct, regardless of whether the employee speaks pursuant to
his job duty. 74
72. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521, 529-38 (presenting historical support for the proposition that the First Amendment was intended
in part to provide a check on "the inherent tendency of government officials to abuse the power en-
trusted to them"); id. at 554-65 (comparing the checking value theory, which concentrates on abuse by
government officials as a significant and foreseeable harm in a democracy and calls for heightened
constitutional protection of speech that would curtail it, with Professor Alexander Meiklejohn's self-
government theory, which accords absolute protection to a broader range of democracy-promoting
speech, including all speech that serves to inform citizen-voters, such as education and discourse on
public issues).
74. See id. at 634 ("Since under the checking value information about the conduct of government
is accorded the highest possible valuation, speech critical of public officials by those persons in the best
position to know what they are talking about-namely, government employees-would seem to deserve
special protection. Thus, a proponent of the checking value should demand an extremely strong regula-
2008] 377
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In sum, under Justice Kennedy's assumptions about the Pickering in-
terests and work-required speech, the interests in protecting such speech
could never outweigh the government's significant interests in efficient
management, since Justice Kennedy recognized no interest of the individ-
ual or the public in work-required speech. 75 If the interests favoring protec-
tion of work-required speech can never outweigh the government's
interests in controlling that speech, Justice Kennedy's bright-line rule is not
arbitrarily drawn.
However, Justice Souter persuasively argued that the public and the
employee both can have a significant interest in the employee's work-
required speech. 76 Indeed, considerations of the relevant First Amendment
theories suggest that the public has a particular interest in the informed
opinions of public employees that relate to their job duties. As Justice
Souter contended, a Pickering balance could weigh in favor of the em-
ployee even for speech made pursuant to an official duty where the gov-
ernment has a significant interest as an employer.77 Thus, the majority's
bright-line approach is not ideal. While the majority's approach could be
defensible if it leads to other benefits that justify the use of an arbitrary (or
at least imprecise) bright-line rule, this rule entails several practical draw-
backs, which are discussed in the next section.
IV. PRACTICAL AND POLICY REPERCUSSIONS
The dissenting justices not only disagreed with the majority's underly-
ing assumptions about the interests involved in speech made pursuant to
work duties, but also raised practical and policy concerns about the result
of the majority's new rule. Three of these concerns are substantiated by a
review of recent decisions applying the Garcetti rule: (a) the scope of ac-
tual job duties is difficult to determine under Garcetti's standard, and the
malleable standard is easily manipulated by parties and applied inconsis-
tently by courts; (b) courts are unlikely to afford First Amendment review
to an employee's speech to a supervisor, and these decision will ultimately
discourage internal complaints; and (c) the Garcetti rule may provide the
most limited protection for those employees whose speech is most valuable
to society, since employees in a position to obtain extensive information
tory justification before permitting public employees to be disciplined for criticizing their colleagues.")
(citations omitted).
75. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
76. Id. at 1965-67 (Souter, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1967.
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are likely to have broad job duties. These three concerns are discussed be-
low along with proposed methods for minimizing the possible harms.
A. Courts Struggle to Consistently Define Job Duties
Ceballos did not dispute that he wrote the memos at issue pursuant to
his job duties. 78 Because the scope of Ceballos's job duties was not at is-
sue, Justice Kennedy's opinion gave little guidance for determining when
speech is made pursuant to job duties. 79 Therefore, while Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion established a bright-line exclusion from First Amendment
protection of speech made pursuant to job duties, it did not clearly outline
what an employee's job duties are "for First Amendment purposes. '80
Rather, Justice Kennedy's opinion invited courts to engage in a factually
driven inquiry to discover what an employee "actually is expected" to do.81
He characterized the inquiry as a "practical one," where formal job descrip-
tions are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the scope of an em-
ployee's job duties.82
This lack of clarity is a problem, since Justice Kennedy supported his
bright-line approach as a way to limit judicial scrutiny of the relations be-
tween the government, as employer, and its employees.83 As Justice Souter
noted, the majority invites, rather than guards against, intrusive fact-bound
litigation, since the issue of whether a public employee's statements were
made pursuant to official duties is "apparently based on the totality of em-
ployment circumstances. '84 As one district judge writes, "[w]hether the
water has been somewhat cleared or further muddied by Garcetti remains
to be seen. Suffice it to say, many billable hours will likely be spent wran-
gling over the scope of every employee-plaintiff's 'official duties.' 85 Jus-
tice Souter pointed out the uncertainty involved in such determinations by
posing difficult hypotheticals: "Are prosecutors' discretionary statements
about cases addressed to the press on the courthouse steps made 'pursuant
to their official duties'? Are government nuclear scientists' complaints to
78. Id. at 1960 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 1961.
80. Id. at 1962.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1961-62.
83. Id. at 1961.
84. Id. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Price v. Macleish, Nos. 04-956(GMS), 04-1207(GMS), 2006 WL 2346430, at *5 (D. Del.
Aug. 14, 2006), affd, Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007).
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their supervisors about a colleague's improper handling of radioactive ma-
terials made 'pursuant' to duties?"'86
1. Courts cannot rely on formal job expectations.
One reason that courts will struggle with finding the scope of an em-
ployee's job duties is that the most concrete, simple indicators are not de-
terminative of a job duty-the Garcetti majority stated that job descriptions
are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a job duty. 87 Accordingly,
courts have discounted job descriptions and formal policies that do not
appear to fall under the employer's actual expectations of job perform-
ance.88 For example, in Barclay v. Michalsky, a nurse was disciplined after
she complained to supervisors about misconduct by other workers, includ-
ing sleeping on the job and using excessive patient restraints. 89 All of the
hospital employees were required by a work rule to report violations of
work policies and procedures, as the nurse had done. 90 Nevertheless, the
court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that
the work rule did not establish that the nurse spoke pursuant to her job du-
ties where she had not been trained to report violations and had repeatedly
been told not to file reports and that no forms were available for such re-
ports.9 1
Nor does the subject matter of speech establish whether it falls within
the scope of an employee's job duties.92 Indeed, the Garcetti majority
86. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1962 (majority opinion).
88. See Skrutski v. Marut, No. 3:CV-03-2280, 2006 WL 2660691, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15,
2006); Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 395-96 (D. Conn. 2006); Batt v. City of Oakland,
No. C 02-04975 MHP, 2006 WL 1980401, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006); see also Morales v. Jones,
494 F.3d 590, 600-01 (7th Cit. 2007) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (while the majority concluded that a
police officer's speech to an assistant district attorney was made pursuant to his specific duty to deliver
a report and pursuant to a general department policy "to report all potential crimes," the dissenting
judge noted evidence that actual police practice conflicted with general department policy).
89. Barclay, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
90. Id. at 395.
91. Id. at 389, 395-96; see also Batt, 2006 WL 1980401, at ** 1, 4 (holding that police regulations
requiring an officer to report misconduct did not establish a job duty, where the officer was repeatedly
told not to report misconduct and threatened about the consequences of making such a report).
92. Day v. Borough of Carlisle, No. I:CV-04-1040, 2006 WL 1892711, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 10,
2006) (citing Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959). But see Shuck v. Clark, No. 8:05-CV-2042-T-30TBM, 2006
WL 2882702, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2006) (granting plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of an order
dismissing her First Amendment claim, but opining that plaintiff acted within her job duties when she
cooperated with an investigation of another government employee because she provided information
that she obtained while performing her job duties); Dillon v. Fermon, No. 04-CV-2029, 2006 WL
2457516. at *4 (C.D. Il. Aug. 23, 2006) (state police trooper's conversation with a prosecutor was
made pursuant to his job duties because it "concerned an investigation and arrest in which Plaintiff had
participated as part of his official duties" and because his job duties included working to obtain a just
and successful prosecution).
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clearly stated that Ceballos's memo "concerned the subject matter of [his]
employment, but this, too, is nondispositive. The First Amendment protects
some expressions related to the speaker's job."'93 Further, the Garcetti ma-
jority defended its holding on the grounds that public employees would
"retain the prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to
the civic discourse," including contributions that relate to the subject of
their employment. 94
Under Garcetti, courts must instead frame the inquiry around a more
nebulous standard: what speech or conduct an employee "is expected to
perform." 95 This inquiry would be easy to apply should employer and em-
ployee agree about what is expected. For example, a court found that two
employees' complaints about unsafe conditions in the workplace were
within their job duties because their supervisor praised them for identifying
unsafe conditions, prior employees in the same role had made similar re-
ports, and the plaintiffs admitted that they felt responsible for reporting
unsafe conditions.96
However, under the Garcetti rule it is unlikely that employers and
employees will agree about the scope of job duties. The precise scope will
often be open to debate and each party's success in litigation will hinge on
whether or not the job duties include the speech at issue. In Casey v. West
Las Vegas Independent School District, the Tenth Circuit noted that before
Garcetti the defendants described the speech at issue as "ultra vires" and
"disruptive," while the plaintiff argued that she "had a duty as Head Start's
executive director" to engage in the speech at issue.97 Not surprisingly,
both parties "swap[ped] positions" after Garcetti to meet their objectives
under the new rule.98
Indeed, disagreement over what the employee is expected to do is not
just a product of litigation. Often employment retaliation cases result from
a legitimate disagreement between employee and employer about what
conduct the employee should engage in. When the parties dispute what was
expected, whose assertions should prevail? Further, neither party's precise
expectations are easily discernible. An employee's expectations about job
duties are often intermingled with more personal motivations that stem
93. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1959 (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414
(1979)).
94. Id. at 1960.
95. See id. at 1962.
96. Price v. Macleish, Nos. 04-956(GMS), 04-1207(GMS), 2006 WL 2346430, at **6-8 (D. Del.
Aug. 14, 2006), ajfJd, Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007).
97. 473 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (10th Cir. 2007).
98. Id. at 1330.
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from ethics or personal ideologies. An employer's expectations can be
ambiguous or even contradictory, such as when a supervisor actively dis-
courages an employee from engaging in conduct that the organization re-
quires.
2. Courts are inconsistent in their treatment of the employee's subjective
motivations.
Courts will struggle to determine whether an employee's speech is
made pursuant to job duties because an employee's sense of duty can stem
not only from the employer's expectations, but from personal or profes-
sional duties. For example, in U.S. ex rel. Battle v. Board of Regents, the
plaintiff worked as a financial aid officer at a public university. 99 The
plaintiff suspected that members of her department, including her supervi-
sor, were engaged in fraudulent mismanagement of federal work-study
funds. 100 Although the plaintiff recorded suspicious activity and then con-
fronted her supervisor and the university president, no one responded to her
suspicions; within months the plaintiff received notice that her contract
would not be renewed.' 0 ' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judg-
ment for the defendants on the First Amendment claim. 102 The plaintiff's
speech to her supervisor and the president was not protected under the First
Amendment because she admitted she was under a duty as a financial aid
officer to report inaccuracies and signs of fraud in student files. 103
Despite the outcome in Battle, it appears that the plaintiff acted not
only to fulfill a job duty, but also out of a sense of personal obligation. She
persevered in reporting the wrongdoing even though her supervisors did
not support her conduct. 104 After receiving notice that her contract would
not be renewed, the plaintiff conveyed her suspicions and documentation to
the Department of Education.105 The ensuing investigation confirmed the
plaintiffs suspicions of inappropriate conduct and resulted in a $2,167,941
settlement with the university. 106 Thus, although she reported misconduct
to her supervisors "pursuant to her official employment responsibilities," it
99. 468 F.3d 755, 757 (1 Ith Cir. 2006).
100. Id. at 758.
101, Id-
102. Id. at 761-62.
103. Id.; see also Maras-Roberts v. Phillippe, No. I:05-CV-1 148-SEB-JMS, 2007 WL 1239119, at
*6 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2007) (plaintiff's possible "longstanding personal interest" in questioning the
legality of a judge's probation practices did not impact the court's determination that she advocated for
systemic change pursuant to her duties as a public defender in that judge's court).
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appears that the plaintiff was primarily motivated not by her employer's
expectations of her but out of a personal sense of responsibility. 1
0 7
While the Battle court did not mention the financial aid officer's pos-
sible personal motivations, other courts have been more willing to consider
the presence of other motivations to find that speech made according to
personal or professional duties is not necessarily speech made pursuant to
an actual job duty. 108 In Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation District, an
engineer complained internally and externally about the district's alleged
mishandling of water resources, purportedly acting out of a sense of "per-
sonal and ethical obligation as a professional engineer."' 109 The district
asserted that the plaintiffs "obligation as a professional engineer is insepa-
rable from his obligation as an employee of [the district] because he was
hired by [the district] to work as an engineer."1 0 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that the plaintiffs testimony that he spoke pursuant to a profes-
sional obligation did not establish that he spoke pursuant to a job duty, and
the open factual issues surrounding plaintiffs job duties precluded sum-
mary judgment for the defendants. I'
Similarly, the court in Deluzio v. Monroe County held that a case
worker's statements to his superior were made as a citizen, and not as an
employee, even though they related to the treatment of a child that was also
the case worker's client.1 12 The court recognized that the case worker, mo-
tivated by both "professionalism and ethics," reported concerns to his supe-
rior not because he was expected to do so as a case worker, but for the
same reasons that any citizen might feel morally obligated to speak out
when a child's welfare is at risk. 113 The case worker also complained that
proposed agency budget cuts would harm the children who relied on the
agency's services; the court found this speech similarly motivated by moral
obligation and analogized his reports to a citizen's speech at a city council
meeting.11 4 Because a citizen's speech in a town meeting would be pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the court concluded that the case worker's
107. See id. at 759, 761.
108. See Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist., No. S-05-0740 FCD EFB, 2006 WL 3741878, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006); Deluzio v. Monroe County, No. 3:CV-00-1220, 2006 WL 3098033, at
**6-7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006).
109. Shewbridge, 2006 WL 3741878, at *1, 3-4.
110. Id. at *6 (quoting from defendants' memorandum).
111. Id.
112. Deluzio, 2006 WL 3098033, at *7.
113. Id.
114. Id. at "6.
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analogous speech should also be afforded protection from unjustified gov-
ernment retaliation."15
Another court has noted that employees' subjective motivations-
even a subjective belief that their job required them to speak--do not estab-
lish such a job duty. 116 The court in Black v. Columbus Public Schools
cited Garcetti for the proposition that "the proper focus is on the em-
ployee's official job duties, not necessarily on the employee's motiva-
tions-whether based on perceived job duties or personal gratification."
117
An employee's sense of duty is not conclusive because "[c]ertainly, any
employee may feel obligated, morally and/or professionally, to report mis-
conduct by a supervisor."" 18
In sum, courts have adopted different approaches when considering
(or refusing to consider) the employee's subjective motivations in deter-
mining whether the employee spoke pursuant to a job duty. The principles
articulated in Shewbridge and Deluzio are appealing. 19 When employees
act out of a sense of personal duty, their speech is more akin to a citizen's
speech than to pure employee speech. Nevertheless, sole reliance on sub-
jective motivations to determine whether speech was made pursuant to a
job duty would be inappropriate. Such a reliance on subjective motivations
would not fulfill the factual inquiry required by Garcetti, and would allow
plaintiffs to survive motions for summary judgment merely by alleging a
sense of personal duty.
3. Courts are inconsistent in determining the scope of the employer's
expectations.
Courts have also adopted differing approaches to determining the pre-
cise scope of the employer's expectations of job performance. An em-
ployer's expectations often encompass an array of unarticulated
115. See id. at *9; see also Skrutski v. Marut, No. 3:CV-03-2280, 2006 WL 2660691, at *10 (M.D.
Pa. Sept. 15, 2006) (reasoning that a police officer's complaint that he was encouraged to falsify a
report was not speech pursuant to his job duty because a citizen could bring an analogous complaint).
But see Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist, 480 F.3d 689, 692-94 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an
athletic director's memoranda to the school's office manager and principal regarding mismanagement
of athletic funds were written pursuant to his job duties, even though the director claimed to have acted
as a ."taxpayer' and a 'father' and the defendant admitted that the athletic director was not required to
write such memoranda).
116. Black v. Columbus Pub. Schs., No. 2:96-CV-326, 2006 WL 2385359, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
17, 2006).
117. Id.
118. Id. at *5 n.6.
119. See Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation District, No. S-05-0740 FCD EFB, 2006 WL3741878,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006); Deluzio, 2006 WL 3098033, at **6-7.
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assumptions. Because employer expectations are often nebulous, courts
have the ability to construe them very broadly or very narrowly.
Perhaps the most sweeping interpretation of employer expectations in
recent cases is that in Springer v. City of Atlanta.120 The plaintiff in
Springer served as executive director of the Atlanta Workforce Develop-
ment Board, and his employers included the city and the Atlanta Workforce
Development Agency. 121 The plaintiff reported the Agency's fiscal mis-
management to the mayor and the city's legal staff.122 The plaintiff asserted
that he was not required to report the fiscal mismanagement under his day-
to-day job responsibilities, which included "policy and system building,
member support, external relations, administration and compliance."',
23
However, the court was persuaded by the defendant that the plaintiffs
speech was made pursuant to his obligations as an employee, since "Geor-
gia law imposes on employees 'a duty of loyalty, faithful service and re-
gard for an employer's interest.""' 124  In reporting the financial
mismanagement, the plaintiff "spoke out of 'regard for his employer's in-
terest,"' and therefore acted pursuant to a job duty. 125
The Springer court's expansive reasoning would seem to preclude
First Amendment protection for any whistleblower public employee in
Georgia, since all employees are expected under state law to act to preserve
their employer's interest. But this approach bears little resemblance to the
"practical" inquiry prescribed by Garcetti.
Other courts have interpreted employer expectations more strictly.
One court, in Walters v. County of Maricopa, expressly rejected Springer's
expansive approach to Garcetti's exclusion. 126 The court emphasized that
the inquiry is not just about work responsibilities: it is about job duties "as
those duties are regarded by the First Amendment."' 127 The court refused to
find that the plaintiff's job duties included the obligation to report the mis-
conduct of his fellow employees:
120. No. 1:05-CV-0713 GET, 2006 WL 2246188 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4,2006).
121. Id. at*1.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id.
124. Id. at **3-4; cf. Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1242, 1242 n.2 (11th Cir.
2007) (holding that a city clerk acted pursuant to her job duties when she reported a former mayor's
misconduct, including sexual harassment and personal use of city resources, because her job required
her to inquire into and report any misuse of city funds, but declining to decide whether "all city em-
ployees owe a duty of loyalty to the city as a matter of Georgia state law").
125. Springer, 2006 WL 2246188, at *4.
126. No. 04-1920-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 2456173, at *14 n.10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (declining
to follow Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006), and Springer, 2006 WL
2246188, at **3-4).
127. Id. at * 14.
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Walters was a police sergeant employed to investigate and assist in the
prosecution of criminal drug offenders. Any attempt to inflate Walters'
job description so as to include blowing the whistle on other officers
would likely exceed the "practical inquiry" suggested by the Supreme
Court.... [Garcetti] should not be read to overrule all First Amendment
whistleblower protection cases by generally categorizing whistleblowing
as part of employees' employment obligations.
128
Those courts that want to protect speech on matters of public concern
can interpret job duties narrowly, looking to what the employer actually
expects from the employee. By contrast, those courts that want to defer to
the government's decisionmaking can interpret job duties broadly, without
inquiring into what the employer actually expected from the employee in
terms of their job duty.
In sum, the scope of public employees' job duties will continue to be
debated in the courts. Courts face significant difficulties in determining the
scope of job duties since formal job descriptions are not decisive, employ-
ees often have mixed motivations for speaking, and employers' expecta-
tions are often unstated or inconsistent. As courts work toward consistent
application of the Garcetti standard, they should construe job duties nar-
rowly, with reference to the specific, explicit requirements of the employer
rather than broad, implicit obligations. Narrow construction of job duties
allows courts to protect individual and public interests in an employee's
speech, and these interests can be significant. Furthermore, limiting the
reach of the Garcetti exception poses little risk of interfering with govern-
ment management, since the government's interests are duly weighed un-
der the Pickering balancing test.
B. Garcetti Creates an Incentive for Public Employees to Avoid Internal
Complaints
Justice Stevens opined that the Garcetti rule would create an un-
wanted incentive for government employees to air grievances in the public
forum instead of resolving them internally. 129 Given the outcome of recent
litigation, this concern is legitimate. While the inquiry into what is ex-
pected of an employee is inevitably factually based, one generalization that
can be drawn from recent cases is that when misconduct is exposed within
the chain of command, speech is likely to be within the scope of one's job
128. Id.; see also Drolett v. Demarco, No. 3-05CV1335(JCH), 2007 WL 1851102, at *6 (D. Conn.
June 26, 2007) (holding that a police department's general requirement that employees report "all
matters 'of police interest' did not conclusively establish a job duty because such a broad construction
of job duties would improperly make the subject matter of the speech dispositive and would afford no
First Amendment protection for any employee speech related to the subject matter of employment).
129. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1963 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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duty, but when misconduct is exposed outside the chain of command,
speech likely exceeds the scope of one's job duty.
This generalization does not hold true for those jobs that specifically
require an employee to speak to outside parties. For example, a county
auditor in Dunleavy v. Wayne County Commission spoke pursuant to his
job duties when he reported government corruption to the media and law
enforcement, where he had testified that reporting findings to those indi-
viduals was "absolutely" part of his job duty. 130 In Levy v. Office of the
Legislative Auditor, another auditor spoke pursuant to his job duties when
he criticized department policies during a Toastmaster's speech that was a
required part of his training. 13'
The Garcetti majority reaffirmed that the subject matter and place of
speech is not determinative of whether that speech is protected under the
First Amendment. 132 Prior Supreme Court precedent, which was cited in
Garcetti, established that an employee's speech may be protected under the
First Amendment even when employees speak to their employer rather than
the public. 133 In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, a
schoolteacher was fired for complaining to her principal about school poli-
cies. 134 Although her speech was made privately to her supervisor-in
contrast to the public letter in Pickering-the speech was nevertheless pro-
tected under the First Amendment.135 Thus, in theory the intended audience
of speech should not be determinative of whether speech is made pursuant
to work duties and precluded from First Amendment protection. However,
in practice the intended audience of speech appears to be a primary indica-
tor of whether speech will be found to be made pursuant to work duties.
Indeed, speech made to other government agencies likely receives
First Amendment review even if that speech relates to one's job duties. 136
For example, one court concluded that where the defendant claimed that
130. No. 04-CV-74670-DT, 2006 WL 2375679, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2006); see also Ibarra
v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, No. 06-5691, 2007 WL 579670, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 23,
2007) (plaintiff spoke pursuant to his job duties as Coordinator of Immigrant Services when he spoke to
local government officials and a newspaper regarding problems facing the Hispanic community).
131. 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 498 (M.D. La. 2006).
132. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959.
133. Id. (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
134. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 411-12.
135. Id. at414-16.
136. See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006) (corrections officer's speech to state
senator and state office of the Inspector General regarding abusive working conditions was protected);
Barber v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., No. 3:05-CV-142-R, 2006 WL 3772206,
at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2006) (employee's report to Commonwealth Attorney General of coworker
misconduct within county sewer district was protected); Rohr v. Nehls, No. 04-C-477, 2006 WL
2927657, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 2006) (deputy sheriff's filing of complaint with county board chair-
man regarding sheriff's official conduct was protected).
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the plaintiff exceeded his authority by using improper channels to bring a
complaint, the plaintiffs speech was not made pursuant to his work duties,
since the defendant could not claim that the plaintiff was expected to ex-
ceed his authority. 1
37
By contrast, a whistleblower who exposes corruption internally is less
likely to receive First Amendment protection against retaliation. For exam-
ple, in Freitag v. Ayers, a corrections officer complained to her superiors
about the sexually hostile environment at the prison where she worked. 138
While her statements to superiors were not protected, her subsequent letters
to a senator and the state's Inspector General's office were made as a citi-
zen and were protected under the First Amendment. 139
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Mills v. City of Evansville held that a
police sergeant spoke pursuant to her job duties when she complained
about a new policy to her superiors. 140 The sergeant had attended a meeting
regarding a new plan that impacted the sergeant's duties in supervising
crime prevention officers. After the meeting, the sergeant told her superiors
that she did not think the plan would work. The court held that the sergeant
spoke pursuant to her job duties because she "was on duty, in uniform, and
engaged in discussion with her superiors, all of whom had just emerged
from [the meeting]."'141 Had the sergeant complained about the new policy
while off duty, not in uniform, and to the media, her speech would pre-
sumably be protected under the reasoning in Mills.
In sum, the fact that speech is made to a public employee's supervisor
often leads to the conclusion that the speech was made pursuant to work
duties. Under Garcetti, public employees have an incentive to raise com-
plaints to other organizations or to the media rather than communicating
them to their superiors. Such an incentive would seem to negate in part the
benefits of the bright-line rule. The Garcetti rule may seem to allow for
more effective management by making it easier to control employee speech
internally. However, at the same time the Garcetti rule encourages external
airing of grievances, which are likely to interfere with government opera-
tions by creating public backlash or initiating third-party investigation. 142
137. Rohr, 2006 WL 2927657, at *7. The Rohr court also noted that the employer would have
difficulty prevailing under the Pickering balance test where its retaliation against the employee seemed
largely unjustified-the employee's external whistleblowing (which was largely baseless) did little to
disrupt the department's functions. Id.
138. 468 F.3d at 532.
139. Id. at 545-46.
140. 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006).
141. Id. at 648.
142. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading Cases, 120 HARv. L. REV. 125, 280 (2006).
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Further, the stifling of internal dissenters runs contrary to the goal of pro-
moting government efficiency in that it inhibits informed decisionmaking,
which requires that members of an organization share ideas without fear of
arbitrary reprisal. 
143
C. Garcetti Fails to Protect the Most Valuable Speakers
As Justice Souter noted, speech pursuant to public employment may
well be more valuable to the individual and the public than other speech by
public employees, since the employee is likely to know more about the
subject matter of his employment. 144 However, those public employees that
are likely the most informed, and therefore more likely to engage in valu-
able speech, are also those who are least likely to be protected by the First
Amendment under Garcetti. Indeed, the scope of one's job duties will often
correlate to one's access to information within an organization. Thus, the
more informed public employees are, the more likely their speech will be
pursuant to their expansive job duties, and the less likely they will be to
receive protection from retaliation under the First Amendment.
An individual in a high-level role may not even be protected in his or
her speech made outside of the chain of command. For example, in Casey
v. West Las Vegas Independent School District, a superintendent's speech
was directed in part to an external regulatory body. 145 She advised another
employee to report to federal authorities the district's failure to enforce
Head Start eligibility requirements. 146 Her speech was nevertheless seen as
part of her expansive duties as "chief overseer" of Head Start for the dis-
trict. 147
At the same time, lower-level employees who speak on matters that
are not within the purview of their authority will be more likely to satisfy
Garcetti's rule and receive First Amendment review of their claim148-yet
143. See id. at 280-81. In addition, withholding protection from internal whistleblowers makes
little sense in terms of First Amendment theory, as discussed in section three. Viewing the First
Amendment as a necessary element of self-government, even internal whistleblowing should receive
protection since it serves the goal of educating voters by exposing hidden facts and beginning the
process of revealing them to the body politic. Viewing the First Amendment as a necessary check
against government abuse, it is imperative to protect any attempt by public employees to expose official
wrongdoing, including attempts to expose abuse to superiors within one's own department.
144. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1965 (Souter, J., dissenting).
145. 473 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (10th Cir. 2007).
146. Id. at 1326.
147. Id. at 1331; see also Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App'x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff's
testimony regarding unsafe conditions at county jail was given pursuant to her duties as chiefjailer).
148. See, e.g., Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2007) (public works director's
statements regarding sunshine law compliance, made during job-required attendance at city council
meetings, were not made pursuant to his job duties where he was not responsible for ensuring compli-
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their speech arguably has less value to the public, because it is less likely to
be informed.
Employees who must speak out in order to comply with their profes-
sional canons or avoid personal criminal or civil liability are also more
likely to provide speech with high value to themselves and to the public.
Justice Breyer noted that although courts generally should not interfere
with the government's management of its employees, there are some cir-
cumstances where such interference may be warranted. 149 He asserted that
where an employee speaks pursuant to professional and constitutional obli-
gations, such speech is deserving of greater protection and the govern-
ment's interest in controlling speech is diminished. 150 Not only did the
majority refuse to accept such an approach, but recent cases show that its
bright-line rule may achieve precisely the opposite effect by affording less
protection for those individuals that may most deserve First Amendment
protection for their work-related speech.
Justice Breyer limited his assertion to the two special circumstances
existing in the Garcetti case-professional canons and constitutionally
required speech. 151 Under the same reasoning, speech that is otherwise
legally required may also present a special circumstance warranting First
Amendment review.
Nevertheless, some courts have reacted to the existence of an affirma-
tive legal duty to speak by denying First Amendment review under Gar-
cetti.152 In Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District, discussed
above, a superintendent brought a First Amendment claim against the
school board members who demoted and then terminated her after she re-
ported legal violations to the board and to other government entities.
153
One of the alleged bases for the board's retaliation was the superintendent's
ance with that law); Harris v. Tunica County, No. 2:05CV126, 2007 WL 397056, at *2 (N.D. Miss.
Feb. 1, 2007) (employee's statements to Internal Affairs investigators were not made pursuant to work
duties, where jailor "was simply a jailer" and her job description "did not entail supervision of other
employees or monitoring the behavior of other employees"); Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp.
2d 857, 867-68 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (unresolved factual issue as to whether recreational programmer's
complaints about accounting and timesheet irregularities were made pursuant to his work duties where
he did not allege that he was responsible for overseeing those activities).
149. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1975 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id.; see also The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading Cases, supra note 143, at 281-83 (pro-
moting similar rule affording First Amendment review for speech made pursuant to professional canons
or constitutional requirements).
151. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1975 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152. See Casey, 473 F.3d at 1329-31; Khan v. Fernandez-Rundle, No. 06-15259, 2007 WL
2859803, at **3-4 (1 1th Cir. Oct. 3, 2007) (assistant state attorney's truthful in-court statements were
made pursuant to his job duties and were not protected speech although he spoke pursuant to his profes-
sional obligation as a member of the state bar to avoid misleading the court).
153. 473 F.3d at 1326-27.
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speech in directing another Head Start employee to report to federal au-
thorities the district's failure to enforce Head Start eligibility require-
ments. 154 Although the superintendent had directed the report to a third
party, and "went very much around" her supervisors, the court held that the
report was made pursuant to the superintendent's work duties. 155 The court
reasoned that the superintendent was responsible for administering the
Head Start program, and also noted that the superintendent "risked civil
and criminal liability by remaining silent in the face of such knowledge."']56
The court characterized her obligation as "a federal regulatory obligation
directly bearing on her by virtue of the office she held," and as more simi-
lar to a "senior executive acting pursuant to official duties than to that of an
ordinary citizen speaking on his or her own time."
157
Thus, the result after Garcetti may be the exact opposite of what Jus-
tice Breyer proposed. In Justice Breyer's view, the intrusion of First
Amendment review is justified where the employee has an affirmative ob-
ligation to speak that is guided by professional canons or by the Constitu-
tion. 158 However, the actual result from Garcetti may be the opposite-
those who speak out of an affirmative professional or legal duty are less
likely to receive First Amendment review.
CONCLUSION
The Garcetti rule rests on debatable assumptions about the potential
individual and public interests in speech pursuant to public employment job
duties. Despite Justice Kennedy's assertion, it is possible for public em-
ployees to have a significant personal interest in speech that is made pursu-
ant to their work duties, since public employees often act out of a blend of
personal and professional duties. The public has an interest in public em-
ployees' speech on matters of public concern whether it directly informs
the public or indirectly brings issues to light. Further, the public may have
an interest in informed and efficient government decisionmaking that stems
from internal but not external expressions of employees. The public un-
doubtedly has an interest in retaining checks on government abuse, includ-
ing the ability of public employees to report abuse relating to their job
duties without fear of reprisal.
154. Id. at 1326.
155. Id. at 1329, 1331.
156. Id. at 1330.
157. Id. at 1331.
158. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1975 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Beyond these principled objections, there are several viable practical
concerns regarding the bright-line rule adopted in Garcetti. The first practi-
cal limitation of the Garcetti rule is that it limits litigation in the sense that
it precludes Pickering balancing for speech made pursuant to job duties,
but at the same time it increases litigation over the fact-intensive and uncer-
tain issue of whether the speech at issue is made pursuant to job duties.
Courts are faced with several difficulties when discerning the scope of an
employee's job duties. Rigid formal policies and descriptions can provide a
concrete indication of job responsibilities, but they are not sufficient by
themselves to determine a job responsibility, and indeed may not accurately
reflect actual expectations. Further, the employer and employee will inevi-
tably express inconsistent expectations about what a job entails. Neither
party's expectations will be free from ambiguity. Because the factual in-
quiry into job expectations is so imprecise, it allows courts substantial lee-
way to interpret the scope of job expectations very broadly or very
narrowly, leading to inconsistent applications of the First Amendment.
A second practical drawback of the Garcetti rule is that it creates an
incentive for public employees to raise concerns related to the subject of
their employment externally rather than internally, where their concerns
will more directly enhance the government's operations.
Finally, the Garcetti rule is least likely to afford First Amendment
protection where it is arguably most warranted. Those employees who are
most informed as to the topic of their employment are more likely to have
expansive job duties, and are therefore less likely to receive First Amend-
ment review for retaliation based on their informed speech. In addition,
those personally liable for failing to speak may nevertheless be refused
First Amendment review where they speak not only to avoid liability, but
also to fulfill a work responsibility.
As courts continue to define the scope of job duties, the Garcetti stan-
dard will continue to be clarified. At the same time, some of the practical
drawbacks of the new rule can be mitigated. Courts should fulfill the pre-
scribed factual inquiry by adopting a narrow construction of job duties that
is keyed to actual employer expectations rather than broadly-imposed or
implied employee obligations. At the same time, courts should not over-
simplify the inquiry by assuming that speech made to a supervisor is al-
ways speech made pursuant to a job duty, since protecting safe avenues for
internal complaint will benefit government management and serve as an
important check against government abuse. Finally, courts should recog-
nize and protect the significant interests that the employee and the public
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can have in job-related speech that is highly informed or that is also made
pursuant to legal or professional requirements.

